on anybody. The consequences are that we have suffered a major defeat in Latin America.”Korry, who remained as ambassador in 1971, was a concern to them.In December, the state department told him that he was being recalled without a promise of another appointment. During a visit to the United States, Korry went to see Henry Raymont, a former colleague at UPI, at the New York Times . Raymont remembers Korry as agitated, pacing up and down. Korry then described his dismissal to Kissinger as “terribly unsettling.” Henry tried to soften the blow: “ ‘Of course, and you don’t deserve it.’ ‘I don’t know where I go from here . . . with four kids,’ ” Korry added. “ ‘You don’t deserve to have to panic, and don’t,’ ” Henry reassured him. “We will do what we can . . . I am prepared to intervene.”More than compassion was at work in Kissinger’s promise to help Korry. In February, Haig warned Kissinger that “we must be very cautious in our dealing with this individual who has the ability and fund of knowledge to stir some embarrassing speculations in the months ahead. His own background and demonstrated emotionalism in the past would suggest that we must continue to be very cautious both in our communications with him, and, more importantly, in considering his future.”In March, Haig reported his concerns “about the future status of Ambassador Korry.” It was worrisome: “He holds a great many secrets,including the fact that the President both directly and through you communicated to him some extremely sensitive guidance,” Haig wrote Kissinger. “I can think of nothing more embarrassing to the Administration than thrusting a former columnist who is totally alienated from the President and yourself, as well as the Secretary of State, out into the world without a means of livelihood.” It seemed essential to offer Korry “a suitable alternate assignment.”The following day, Kissinger carried Haig’s concerns to Rogers. “I am worried that [Korry] is dangerous,” Henry told Rogers in a phone conversation. “We ought to find some job for him. I am terrified of his knowledge of some of these considerations in the 40 Committee [which planned secret operations] and what he will do when he is defected. Idon’t like him; he has been a disaster there . . . He sat in on two 40 Committee meetings when we discussed [Chile’s] parliamentary ratifi cation.He sent a long back channel of what to do. He is nutty enough to write a long exposé. He is broke, too.” In May, Nixon directed that Korry be offered a “prestigious” post,“though not necessarily substantively important.” Although Rogers described him to Kissinger as “crazy,” he agreed to “find a place for him.”In July, the White House announced that Korry would be replaced in Santiago in the fall and would be assuming another ambassadorial position. When Korry was still without a new assignment in January 1972,state was told to “get him a good position. I believe this is essential as does Henry,” Haig wrote a White House aide. But Korry did not receive another appointment and found a job in the private sector.The problems with Chile and the Middle East were more an irritation in the fall of 1971 than a crisis. True, Vietnam remained a constant and painful concern, but Nixon and Kissinger were not without hope that they could force a settlement before the elections in November 1972. The big news for them was that they had achieved break throughs in their dealings with China and Russia and could look forward to sig-nificant additional gains in the coming year.