on anybody. The consequences are that we have suffered a major defeatin Latin America.”Korry, who remained as ambassador in 1971, was a concern to them.In December, the state department told him that he was being recalledwithout a promise of another appointment. During a visit to the UnitedStates, Korry went to see Henry Raymont, a former colleague at UPI, attheNew York Times . Raymont remembers Korry as agitated, pacing upand down. Korry then described his dismissal to Kissinger as “terribly unsettling.” Henry tried to soften the blow: “ ‘Of course, and you don’tdeserve it.’ ‘I don’t know where I go from here . . . with four kids,’ ” Korry added. “ ‘You don’t deserve to have to panic, and don’t,’ ” Henry reassuredhim. “We will do what we can . . . I am prepared to intervene.”More than compassion was at work in Kissinger’s promise to helpKorry. In February, Haig warned Kissinger that “we must be very cau-tious in our dealing with this individual who has the ability and fund of knowledge to stir some embarrassing speculations in the months ahead. His own background and demonstrated emotionalism in the past wouldsuggest that we must continue to be very cautious both in our communi-cations with him, and, more importantly, in considering his future.”In March, Haig reported his concerns “about the future status of Ambassador Korry.” It was worrisome: “He holds a great many secrets,including the fact that the President both directly and through youcommunicated to him some extremely sensitive guidance,” Haig wroteKissinger. “I can think of nothing more embarrassing to the Adminis-tration than thrusting a former columnist who is totally alienated fromthe President and yourself, as well as the Secretary of State, out into theworld without a means of livelihood.” It seemed essential to offer Korry “a suitable alternate assignment.”The following day, Kissinger carried Haig’s concerns to Rogers. “Iam worried that [Korry] is dangerous,” Henry told Rogers in a phoneconversation. “We ought to find some job for him. I am terrified of hisknowledge of some of these considerations in the 40 Committee [whichplanned secret operations] and what he will do when he is defected. Idon’t like him; he has been a disaster there . . . He sat in on two 40 Com-mittee meetings when we discussed [Chile’s] parliamentary ratifi cation.He sent a long back channel of what to do. He is nutty enough to writea long exposé. He is broke, too.” In May, Nixon directed that Korry be offered a “prestigious” post,“though not necessarily substantively important.” Although Rogers de-scribed him to Kissinger as “crazy,” he agreed to “find a place for him.”In July, the White House announced that Korry would be replaced inSantiago in the fall and would be assuming another ambassadorial posi-tion. When Korry was still without a new assignment in January 1972,state was told to “get him a good position. I believe this is essential asdoes Henry,” Haig wrote a White House aide. But Korry did not receiveanother appointment and found a job in the private sector.The problems with Chile and the Middle East were more an irrita-tion in the fall of 1971 than a crisis. True, Vietnam remained a con-stant and painful concern, but Nixon and Kissinger were not withouthope that they could force a settlement before the elections in November1972. The big news for them was that they had achieved breakthroughsin their dealings with China and Russia and could look forward to sig-nificant additional gains in the coming year.